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COMMENTS
An Attempt to Intervene in the Confusion:
Standing Requirements for Rule 24 Intervenors
Amy M. Gardnert
Suppose you live near a minimum-security, short-term facility
used by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to house aliens
awaiting processing, exclusion, or asylum.' You discover that, contrary
to representations by government officials, many of your "neighbors"
are convicted felons who have completed jail sentences in the United
States and are awaiting a determination of their alien status. A group
of these aliens then start a riot in which forty escape from the facility.
You fear that more convicted felons might escape into your neighbor-
hood.
You then learn that an elected official is suing the Department of
Justice over the situation. You later discover, though, that much of his
suit centers not around the danger to innocent citizens, but on a politi-
cal matter. In addition, given the problems encountered by other
members of Congress in trying to gain standing to sue in similar cases,2
you are concerned that the case will not get into court on the strength
of the official's stake alone. As a result, you, along with some other
homeowners, try to intervene in the suit. Your application to intervene
meets the requirements for permissive intervention under Federal
t B.A. 1997, Luther College; J.D. Candidate 2002, The University of Chicago.
1 This example is based on the facts of Chiles v Thornburgh, 865 F2d 1197 (11th Cir 1989).
For further discussion of the case, see notes 82-87 and accompanying text. The Eleventh Circuit
held that Senator Chiles did not have standing to bring the suit, and the governor of Florida did
not have standing to intervene. Chiles, 865 F2d at 1216. It also found that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the intervention attempts by a local homeowners association
and individual homeowners living near the facility. Id. The court did, however, allow intervention
by Dade County due to the economic burdens that the county was forced to undertake because
of the riots and escapes related to the facility. Id at 1209.
2 See, for example, Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433,438,446 (1939) (finding that legislators
have an "adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes" but declining to ad-
dress the merits of the suit on the grounds that it was a political question). See also Bowsher v
Synar, 478 US 714,721 (1986) (declining to address congressional standing).
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Rule of Civil Procedure 24,3 but the district court refuses to allow your
party to intervene, stating that you do not meet the Article III stand-
ing requirements.4
How can it be that the court does not have jurisdiction over your
interests in the suit when they appear so clear? And as long as you
meet the requirements for intervention set forth by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, how can there be additional requirements when
Rule 24 does not even refer to them? To add insult to injury, you dis-
cover that any appeal may not help your cause, because trial courts
have broad discretion in determining whether to allow permissive in-
tervention.' Finally, had the case originally been brought in a different
circuit, you might have been permitted to intervene.6
3 Rule 24 states in relevant part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene
in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to inter-
vene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that in-
terest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to inter-
vene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to in-
tervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense
upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer
or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement or agreement issued or made pursu-
ant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be
permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider
whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.
4 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1 states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citi-
zens of another State;-between Citizens of different States,-between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
For further discussion of Article III standing, see Part I.A.
5 See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 331 US 519, 524
(1947) ("[I]n the absence of an abuse of discretion, no appeal lies from an order denying leave to
intervene where intervention is a permissive matter within the discretion of the court."); United
States Postal Service v Brennan, 579 F2d 188, 191 (2d Cir 1978) ("Permissive intervention is
wholly discretionary with the trial court.... [The trial court's discretion] may only be disturbed
for clear abuse of discretion.... [Ilndeed, we have not found a single case in which a denial of
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) was reversed solely for an abuse of discretion.") (cita-
tion omitted); Afro-American Patrolmen's League v Duck, 503 F2d 294,298 (6th Cir 1974) ("In-
tervention under Rule 24(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.").
6 See Part II.B for a discussion of the circuit split that causes this result.
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As the example above demonstrates, defining the requirements
for parties to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 is
critically important. While much has been said about intervention of
right under Rule 24(a),7 the rights of those trying to intervene in the
category of "permissive intervention" under Rule 24(b) have not re-
ceived as much attention. Rule 24, along with Article III of the Consti-
tution,$ sets forth requirements for standing, but Rule 24(b)(2) "does
not specify any particular interest that will suffice for permissive in-
tervention and, as the Supreme Court has said, it 'plainly dispenses
with any requirement that the intervenor... have a direct personal or
pecuniary interest in the subject of the litigation."' The lower courts,
however, have been unable to agree as to how this should be inter-
preted and implemented.'
Courts have explained the requirements for permissive interven-
tion by stating: "Given that an application is timely, the Court in its
discretion may permit intervention under Rule 24(b)(2) if the appli-
cant presents a 'claim or defense' which has 'a question of law or fact
in common' with the main action."" While some courts have described
the permissive intervention standard as "liberal,' 2 scholars have gone
so far as to state that an intervenor-by-permission need not "have
been a proper party at the beginning of the suit, since of the two tests
for permissive joinder of parties, a common question of law or fact
and some right to relief arising from the same transaction, only the
first is stated as a limitation on intervention.
7 See, for example, Erik Figio, Stacking the Deck against "Purely Economic Interests":
Inequality and Intervention in Environmental Litigation, 35 Ga L Rev 1219 (2001) (addressing in-
tervention of right in suits under the National Environmental Policy Act); Ellyn J. Bullock, Note,
Acid Rain Falls on the Just and the Unjust: Why Standing's Criteria Should Not Be Incorporated
into Intervention of Right, 1990 U Ill L Rev 605, 610 (arguing that standing should be disentan-
gled from intervention to allow intervention of right in environmental claims); Cindy Vreland,
Comment, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation and Federal Rule 24(a), 57 U Chi L Rev
279, 281 (1990) (arguing that courts should weigh the interests behind Rule 24(a) differently
when a public interest group seeks to intervene in a public law case); Rodrick J. Coffey, Note,
Giving a Hoot about an Owl Does Not Satisfy the Interest Requirement for Intervention: The Mis-
application of Intervention us of Right in Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable
Economic Growth v. Department of Interior, 1998 BYU L Rev 811,812 (arguing that "Article III
standing is the appropriate standard for determining whether a potential intervenor has suffi-
cient interest in the pending litigation to intervene as of right").
8 See note 4.
9 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 7C Federal Practice ani
Procedure § 1911 at 356 (West 1986), quoting SEC v US Realty & Improvement Co, 310 US 434,
459 (1940). Despite this apparently helpful explanation of requirements for intervenors, the cur-
rent split among circuits and commentators demonstrates that the requirements are not so plain
after all.
10 See Part II.A.
1 Usery v Brandel, 87 FRD 670,677 (W D Mich 1980), quoting FRCP 24(b)(2).
12 Usery, 87 FRD at 677.
13 Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7C Federal Practice and Procedure § 1911 at 357 (cited in note
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 683 2002
The University of Chicago Law Review
Nevertheless, actual applications of the rule by some courts do
not reflect this supposed liberal spirit and the accompanying low
threshold. Three different views have been adopted by the various cir-
cuits: (1) a separate showing of Article III standing is not required for
intervention under Rule 24; (2) a separate showing of the Article III
standing requirements must be made; or (3) an Article III inquiry is
not necessary because the Rule 24 requirements actually require a
higher threshold than does Article III.
The Supreme Court has held that intervenors by right or by per-
mission ordinarily have the right to appeal an adverse final judgment
by a trial court, just as parties with standing do." Despite the obvious
argument that, if the intervenors can appeal on their own, they cer-
tainly should be able to join a suit in which the main parties meet the
requirements for standing, the area of intervention is mired in a circuit
split. Part I of this Comment will provide background on standing doc-
trine, the history and policy goals of permissive intervention, the juris-
dictional basis for permissive intervention, and Supreme Court juris-
prudence in this area. Part II will address the three trends among the
lower court rulings and examine the bases relied upon in these court
decisions. Part III will focus on the problems resulting from, and hence
the importance of resolving, the circuit split. In Part IV, this Comment
will suggest the solution that seems most consistent with Rule 24 and
Article III: although an amendment to the Rule making clear that
permissive intervention does not require an additional Article III
showing would be optimal, courts should permit the party seeking to
intervene to do so, provided that (1) the requirements to intervene
under Rule 24 are met, and (2) the original parties remain in the suit
and meet the requirements for standing.
I. BACKGROUND ON STANDING DOCTRINE AND
PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION
A. Standing Doctrine
Although "[t]raditionally, standing was required only of parties
seeking to initiate a lawsuit,'" that is no longer always the case. The
importance of determining whether the court has jurisdiction to hear
a case is clear: "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed in any
cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to
exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing
9) (citation omitted).
14 Stringfellow v Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 US 370,375-76 (1987) ("An interve-
nor, whether by right or by permission, normally has the right to appeal an adverse final judg-
ment by a trial court.").
15 Ruiz v Estelle, 161 F3d 814,830 (5th Cir 1998).
[69:681
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the fact and dismissing the cause."'' 6 In order for the court to have ju-
risdiction over the claim, the parties must have standing.
The Supreme Court has said that standing "does not refer simply
to a party's capacity to appear in court. Rather, standing is gauged by
the specific common-law, statutory, or constitutional claims that a
party presents."7 Generally, two types of standing must be established:
Article III standing and prudential standing that meets the require-
ments of the particular piece of legislation at issue.'r
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution establishes federal court juris-
diction, but limits it to "Cases" and "Controversies,"'" leaving it up to
the Congress whether to establish inferior courts and to determine
their jurisdiction within Article III's framework.0 As the Supreme
Court explained in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,2 the three elements
of standing are:
(1) an "injury in fact" that is "concrete and particularized" and
"actual or imminent";
(2) a causal relationship between the injury and the conduct com-
plained of; and
(3) "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the
injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision."''
In addition, if the plaintiff cannot claim an injury greater than
one sustained as a member of the general public, she cannot meet the
distinct and palpable injury requirement of the Lujan test.2 Moreover,
if Congress has not explicitly acted to create standing through statu-
tory enactment, the plaintiff must also "overcome ... the judiciary's
use of standing as a tool of judicial self-restraint."'4
16 Ex Parte McCardle, 74 US (7 wall) 506,514 (1868).
17 International Primate Protection League v Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund,
500 US 72,77 (1991) (finding standing for organizations and individuals seeking to protect and
obtain custody of three monkeys used for medical experiments).
18 Commentators have explained standing as "a question of substantive law, answerable by
reference to the statutory and constitutional provision whose protection is invoked." William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L J 221,229 (1988).
19 See note 4 for the text of US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
n Sheldon v Sill, 49 US 441,448,449 (1850) ("Congress, having the power to establish [the
lower federal] courts, must define their respective jurisdictions... Congress may withhold from
any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies.").
21 504 US 555 (1992).
22 Id at 560-61 (internal citations omitted).
23 John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 2.12 at 77 (West 5th ed
1995) ("Congress can always create standing by conferring a cash bounty on the victorious plain-
tifE That would assure that plaintiffs relief gives him tangible benefit not available to the public
at large.").
24 Id.
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 685 2002
The University of Chicago Law Review [69:681
If Congress has acted, then in addition to meeting Article III's
requirements, a plaintiff may have to satisfy several prudential princi-
ples in order to have her claim heard.Y For example, generally she
must assert her own rights and not the rights of third parties, she must
be within the zone of interests2 protected by the provisions at issue,
and she cannot raise abstract questions of wide public significance
that amount to "generalized grievance[s]" and are considered best left
to the representative branches.z However, courts frequently assert
that "when the constitutional requisites are met, the basic practical
and prudential concerns underlying the standing doctrine are gener-
ally satisfied."', It should also be noted that the Court has held that
Congress cannot expand jurisdiction beyond Article III through statu-
tory means.29
Applying standing principles to parties seeking to intervene is
where the analysis becomes more difficult. Courts may deny would-be
intervenors Article III standing on the basis that their injuries are not
particularized enough or that the grievance would not be remedied
by the court."
While Article III provides the general framework for analyzing
standing, and prudential concerns must be considered, this Comment
argues that once the plaintiffs in a suit meet the Article III require-
ments, analysis of the issue of standing for intervenors should extend
25 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 13 Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3536 at 347 (West 2d ed 1986) ("Once this [Article III] threshold his been crossed, a
variety of prudential limits may be imposed.").
26 See, for example, Nowak and Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 2.12 at 78 (cited in note 23)
("[T]he question is whether the entire statutory scheme (not merely the statute under which
plaintiffs have sued) evidences an intent to preclude judicial review at the plaintiff's request.").
27 Chiles v Thornburgh, 865 F2d 1197, 1205 (11th Cir 1989). For further discussion of this
case, see Part II.B.1.
28 Duke Power Co v Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc, 438 US 59,81 (1978).
29 Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44,73 (1996) ("Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional limits placed upon federal jurisdiction."); Gladstone, Realtors v Vil-
lage of Bellwood, 441 US 91,100 (1979):
Congress may, by legislation, expand standing to the full extent permitted by Art. III, thus
permitting litigation by one who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules. In
no event, however, may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima: A plaintiff suffered "a dis-
tinct and palpable injury to himself" that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is
granted.
30 See, for example, Palila v Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, 2000 US
App LEXIS 33704, *2 (9th Cir) (holding that an intervenor did not have standing due to failure
to demonstrate a concrete, particularized injury should the Palila, an endangered bird, become
extinct).
31 See, for example, United States v Oregon, 122 FRD 571,579 (D Or 1988) (denying per-
missive intervention because of delay and because the would-be intervenors had not shown that,
even if they were successful in their suit to be considered in a renegotiation of the Columbia
River Fish Management Plan, a renegotiated plan would be more favorable to their interests).
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beyond a cursory reading of the text of the Article to include the his-
torical and policy goals of permissive intervention.
B. The History and Policy Goals of Permissive Intervention
Intervention originated in the equity motion allowing a nonparty
with a superior claim to property held by a sequestrator or receiver to
claim his interest. In United States courts, the practice was adapted to
allow multi-party disputes lacking complete diversity of citizenship to
proceed with all parties.33
Today, intervention is frequently relied upon by groups attempt-
ing to protect the public interest. Examples include state governments
trying to intervene in actions brought by the United States, govern-
mental entities intervening in private litigation,35 organizations seeking
to intervene in cases that potentially affect their members or objec-
tives,- and individuals trying to protect what they feel is in the public
interest.7
Without the option of intervention, these interests might never be
heard in court as part of a particular case because the parties to the
original suit represent different interests. Instead, the parties who wish
to intervene would be faced with three options: sit back and watch as
the court makes a determination without hearing their side, and then
try to file a separate suit to disrupt the judgment in the original action;
try to sway the political system; or give up without having their voices
heard. As a result, these pressures have meant that the doctrine of
permissive intervention has been "justified by... [the goal of avoid-
ing] injustice. '
32 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Colin C. Tait, and William A. Fletcher, Pleading and Procedure:
State and Federal Cases and Materials 753-54 (Foundation 8th ed 1999).
33 Id.
34 See, for example, Cascade Natural Gas Corp v El Paso Natural Gas Co, 386 US 129,135-
36 (1987) (upholding intervention by the state of California on the grounds that its interests were
inadequately represented in an antitrust suit involving companies doing business in California).
35 Many cases, for example, uphold the right of a government to intervene when the consti-
tutionality of one of its laws is at issue. See, for example, Ameron, Inc v United States Army Corps
of Engineers, 787 F2d 875,888 (3d Cir 1986) (upholding the right of Congress to intervene in de-
fense of a federal statute being challenged as unconstitutional); County of San Bernardino v
Harsh California Corp, 52 Cal 2d 341,340 P2d 617,621 (1959) (upholding the right of the federal
government to intervene in a suit in state court over the proper interpretation of a federal stat-
ute).
36 See, for example, Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc v Watt, 713 F2d 525,528-29 (9th Cir 1983) (al-
lowing a conservation group to intervene in a suit against the Secretary of the Interior).
37 See, for example, Jane L. McClellan, Comment, Stopping the Rush to the Death House:
Third-Party Standing in Death-Row Volunteer Cases,26 Ariz St L J 201,228-31 (1994) (discussing
"next friend" standing for family members of prisoners on death row).
38 Note, Intervention in Federal Equity Cases, 31 Colum L Rev 1312,1312 (1931). See note
111 and accompanying text discussing cases in which alleged injustices can be remedied only by
FRCP 24(b).
2002)
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Rule 24(b) has not been amended since it was adopted in 1938. '
However, an amendment to Rule 24(a) (intervention as of right) indi-
cates the intent and spirit of the Rules. When FRCP 24(a) was
amended in 1966, the Advisory Committee, rather than making inter-
vention as of right more difficult, removed a 1948 requirement that
the applicant trying to intervene "is or may be bound by a judgment in
the action."' The Advisory Committee Notes state that the require-
ment was stricken because it could "defeat intervention in some meri-
torious cases.'"
41
The Second Circuit has characterized the 1966 changes to Rule
24(a) as a reflection of the attitude toward intervenors in general:
"The policy of liberalizing the right to intervene in federal actions is
reflected in the change of language of Rule 24(a) in 1966.""2 Thus, the
Advisory Committee Notes regarding intervention under Rule 24(a)
reflect a liberal spirit that would seem to favor minimizing the re-
quirements placed on parties seeking to intervene. When considering
permissive intervention, the 1966 amendment and accompanying Ad-
visory Committee Notes seem to weigh in favor of allowing interven-
tion in more meritorious cases, rather than fewer. 3
C. Jurisdictional Basis for Permissive Intervention
The issue of standing for intervenors has not always received its
current treatment. Some earlier cases addressed the issue of standing
39 Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7C Federal Practice and Procedure § 1910 at 354-55 (cited in
note 9).
40 The pre-1966 version of Rule 24(a) stated:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a
statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the
representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and
the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is
so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer
thereof
FRCP 24(a) (1948), reprinted in Moore's Federal Rules and Official Forms 143 (Matthew Bender
1956). The 1966 amendments removed the second and third categories listed above and added a
new category. See note 3 for the current text of the rule.
41 FRCP 24, Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 Amendments.
42 United States Postal Service v Brennan, 579 F2d 188, 193 (2d Cir 1978) (Oakes dissent-
ing) ("The prior text of Rule 24 spoke in terms of whether representation by existing parties 'is
or may be inadequate.' The present rule provides for intervention 'unless the applicant's interest
is adequately represented by existing parties."'), quoting Nuesse v Camp, 385 F2d 694,702 (DC
Cir 1967).
43 It is true that the Advisory Committee's choice not to amend FRCP 24(b) might indicate
that it did not intend this liberal spirit to apply to permissive intervention. Absent any sort of ex-
plicit statement on permissive intervention from the Advisory Committee since 1938 and absent
any indication that an amendment of FRCP 24(b) was considered but rejected, analogizing from
the Advisory Committee's actions and statements regarding FRCP 24(a) seems to be the only
way to incorporate the Committee's intent in an analysis of permissive intervention.
[69:681
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for intervenors in the language of ancillary jurisdiction.' Since those
cases, however, the practices of pendent jurisdiction 's and ancillary ju-
risdiction have been codified as supplemental jurisdiction in 28 USC
§ 1367(a)." In addition to establishing supplemental jurisdiction, sec-
tion 1367 establishes that, even where the district court has original ju-
risdiction over the suit,
[it] shall not have supplemental jurisdiction ... over claims by
plaintiffs against persons made parties under [Rule 24] ... or
over claims by persons ... seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under
Rule 24 ... when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such
claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements
of section 1332.47
Many earlier cases decided under the doctrine of ancillary juris-
diction held that ancillary jurisdiction alone did not supply "the inde-
pendent jurisdictional grounds required for permissive intervention. '
'
4
However, according to the district court in Usery v Brandel,49
the same authorities state with equal certainty that no independ-
ent jurisdictional basis is necessary for intervention as of right.
Rule 24(a), however, [cannot expand the courts' jurisdiction]. In-
tervention under section (a) is permitted without consideration
of jurisdiction only because, due to the demanding standard for
44 "[A]ncillary jurisdiction [is a] court's jurisdiction to adjudicate claims and proceedings
that arise out of a claim that is properly before the court .... The concept of ancillary jurisdiction
has now been codified, along with the concept of pendent jurisdiction, in the supplemental-
jurisdiction statute." Black's Law Dictionary 855 (West 7th ed 1999). The supplemental jurisdic-
tion statute is 28 USC § 1367 (1994). See notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
45 Pendent jurisdiction was "a court's jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim over
which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction, because the claim arises from the same transac-
tion or occurrence as another claim that is properly before the court" Black's Law Dictionary at
856-57 (cited in note 44).
46 The most relevant part of 28 USC § 1367(a) states:
[Aside from a few exceptions,] in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention
of additional parties.
47 28 USC § 1367(b). The jurisdiction requirements of § 1332 include diversity of citizen-
ship among the parties and the amount in controversy requirement of seventy-five thousand dol-
lars. 28 USC § 1332(a) (1994 & Supp 1998).
48 Usery, 87 FRD 670, 681 (W D Mich 1980). In support of the proposition, Usery cites
Blake v Pallan, 554 F2d 947,956-57 (9th Cir 1977); Warren G. Kleban Engineering Corp v Cald-
well, 490 F2d 800, 802 (5th Cir 1974); Babcock & Wilcox Co v Parsons Corp, 430 F2d 531, 540
(8th Cir 1970); James Wm. Moore, 3B Moore's Federal Practice § 24.18 at 24-177 to 24-183 (Mat-
thew Bender 2d ed 1996); Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 75 at 373 (West 3d ed
1976).
49 87 FRD 670 (W D Mich 1980).
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intervention as of right, ancillary jurisdiction is always present.
The laxer standard of Rule 24(b)(2) [permissive intervention] ...
provides no such guarantee, and applications under its terms
must consequently be examined for a jurisdictional basis. 0
The Usery court provided for exceptions if "there is a 'tight
nexus' with a subject matter properly in federal court," and held that
"to the extent that it is the effective basis for ancillary jurisdiction
over interventions of right, ancillary jurisdiction may properly be ex-
ercised if the facts of a particular application for permissive interven-
tion so warrant."'" While not holding that intervenors who meet the
requirements of Rule 24 automatically have standing, the court did
leave room for such an interpretation. As will be discussed below,
many other decisions have adopted the same approach.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
After the adoption of Rule 24(b)(2) in 1938, the Supreme Court
stated that the Rule "plainly dispense[s] with any requirement that the
intervenor ... have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the sub-
ject of the litigation."" The Court has also held that intervenors, both
by right and by permission, ordinarily have the right to appeal an ad-
verse final judgment by a trial court, just as parties with standing do. 3
This Comment argues that if intervenors can appeal a decision in a
suit, they should be able to intervene in the suit, so long as the original
parties have standing and the intervenors meet the requirements of
Rule 24. Despite the fact that the Court appeared to have resolved the
question by apparently discarding any separate Article III standing
requirement,5 the area of intervention is mired in a circuit split."
50 Id at 681 (internal citations omitted).
51 Id, quoting Revere Copper & Brass Inc v Actua Casualty & Surety Co, 426 F2d 709,714
(5th Cir 1970).
52 SEC v US Realty & Improvement Co, 310 US 434,459 (1940).
53 Stringfellow v Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 US 370,375-76 (1987) ("An interve-
nor, whether by right or by permission, normally has the right to appeal an adverse final judg-
ment by a trial court."). See also Didrickson v United States Department of the Interior, 982 F2d
1332,1338 (9th Cir 1992):
An intervenor's standing to pursue an appeal does not hinge upon whether the intervenor
could have sued the party who prevailed in the district court. To determine whether an in-
tervenor may appeal from a decision not being appealed by one of the parties in the district
court, the test is whether the intervenor's interests have been adversely affected by the
judgment. Generally, an intervenor may appeal from any order adversely affecting the in-
terests that served as the basis for intervention, provided that the requirements of Article
III are satisfied.
54 US Realty, 310 US at 459 ("This provision plainly dispenses with any requirement that
the intervenor shall have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the litigation.").
55 See Part II.C for a discussion of the effects of the circuit split.
[69:681
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Courts have taken three different approaches in deciding what is
required of would-be permissive intervenors6 In some instances, the
same court has used multiple approaches in different cases. This Part
describes the Supreme Court's holdings regarding Rule 24, the three
different views to which lower courts have subscribed, and the result-
ing problems.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Rule 24
The Supreme Court has held that an interest under Rule 24(a)(2)
means a "significantly protectable interest,"57 but the Court has never
clearly articulated how the "significantly protectable interest" re-
quirement relates to the Article III requirements or the Rule 24(b)
requirements.3 A consideration of the Court's cases addressing inter-
vention is helpful in attempting to understand the circuit split.
Perhaps the most relevant of the Court's recent opinions, Dia-
mond v Charles,9 is factually distinguishable from the typical interve-
nor cases, which concern standing in the initial suit that involves both
a plaintiff and a defendant. In Diamond, an intervenor was trying to
continue a suit after one of the original parties had dropped out. The
Court held that Article III standing requirements had to be satisfied in
addition to the requirements set forth in Rule 24.6 However, the
Court did not address whether the Article III requirements must be
met in a case in which the original parties remain in the suit.' Rather,
as the Fifth Circuit has recognized, "The Diamond Court merely rec-
ognized that some courts have equated the Rule's interest require-
ment with that of standing."62 The Diamond Court recognized the con-
fusion among the lower courts, yet declined to put forth a clear rule.6
56 The lower court holdings on the question of whether intervenors must meet Article III
standing requirements can only be described as "anomalous." See, for example, Chiles v Thorn-
burgh, 865 F2d 1197,1212 (11th Cir 1989) (stating that lower courts have reached anomalous de-
cisions on the issue of whether a party seeking to intervene must satisfy not only the require-
ments of Rule 24 but also the requirements of Article III).
57 Donaldson v United States, 400 US 517,531 (1971).
58 Chiles v Thornburgh, 865 F2d 1197, 1212 (11th Cir 1989) ("[The Supreme Court] has
never articulated the precise relationship between [the interest required for intervention] and
the Article III standing requirements.").
59 476 US 54 (1986).
60 Id at 69 ("To continue this suit in the absence of Illinois, Diamond himself must satisfy
the requirements of Art. III.").
61 Id at 68-69 ("We need not decide today whether a party seeking to intervene before a
district court must satisfy not only the requirements of 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Ar-
ticle III:').
62 Ruiz v Estelle, 161 F3d 814,831 (5th Cir 1998).The court continued:
Of the cases cited in Diamond, only [Southern Christian Leadership Conference v Kelley,
747 F2d 777 (DC Cir 1984)] maintains that Article III (and not just Rule 24(a)(2) and
24(b)(2)) requires intervenors to possess standing. Unfortunately, the [Kelley] opinion
merely assumes that Article III requires intervenors to possess standing, and offers neither
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In Trbovich v United Mine Workers," the Supreme Court contrib-
uted to the confusion and discrepancies among the circuits because
the holding seemed limited to the specific facts and statute at issue.
The decision was based on the text and legislative history of Title IV
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,6' which ex-
pressly limits the parties who may bring suit to set aside a union elec-
tion.6 The court held that the statute imposed "no bar to intervention
by a union member, so long as that intervention is limited to the
claims of illegality presented by the Secretary's complaint."67 However,
the part of the Court's opinion most relevant to this Comment focuses
on claims by the Secretary of Labor that the petitioners were barred
from intervening in the suit by Rule 24(a).
The Secretary had argued that he adequately represented the pe-
titioner's interests, and thus that intervention should be barred. 6 The
Court rejected that argument, and instead found that there was "5uffi-
cient doubt about the adequacy of representation to warrant interven-
tion." According to the Court, "the requirement of Rule 24 is satis-
fied if the applicant shows that the representation of his interest 'may
be' inadequate, and the burden of making that showing should be
taken as minimal."70 Trbovich, rather than solving the issue, has been
cited by courts both finding and denying standing for intervenors.
precedent nor reasons to support this assertion.
63 See Diamond, 476 US at 68:
[C]ertain public concerns may constitute an adequate 'interest' within the meaning of Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2).... However, the precise relationship between the in-
terest required to satisfy the Rule and the interest required to confer standing, has led to
anomalous decisions in the Courts of Appeals. We need not decide today whether a party
seeking to intervene before a District Court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule
24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III.
64 404 US 528 (1972).
65 Pub L No 86-257,73 Stat 534 (1959), codified at 29 USC §§ 402 et seq (1994).
66 The statute mandated that the Secretary of Labor review the claims of union members
and decide which to file as suits; the union members were prohibited from initiating the suits
themselves. Id. However, the Court found that Title IV did not prevent intervention by a union
member. Trbovich, 404 US at 537.
67 Id.
68 Id at 538.
69 Id.
70 Id at 538 n 10, quoting James Win. Moore, 3B Federal Practice 24.09-1[4] (Matthew
Bender 2d ed 1969).
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B. The Circuit Split on Rule 24(b) Permissive Intervention
1. Cases allowing intervention without a showing of
Article III standing.
The first set of cases has not required a showing of Article III
standing by parties seeking to intervene. In Hodgson v United Mine
Workers,71 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did not
even mention Article III standing when it held: "The right of interven-
tion conferred by Rule 24 implements the basic jurisprudential as-
sumption that the interest of justice is best served when all parties
with a real stake in a controversy are afforded an opportunity to be
heard." In a case decided before the 1966 amendment to Rule 24(a),'
the same court barely mentioned Article III in allowing intervention. '
Instead, the court based its reasoning on the view that the intervenors
had "such a vital interest in the result of [the] suit that they should be
granted permission to intervene as a matter of course unless compel-
ling reasons against such intervention are shown."75
In Ruiz v Estelle,6 however, the Fifth Circuit extensively dis-
cussed Article III standing, permissive intervention, and intervention
as of right when determining whether two Texas legislators had the
right to intervene in a twenty-five-year-old suit regarding Texas prison
conditions. The court assumed arguendo that the legislators would not
meet the requirements of standing, but held that "Article III does not
require intervenors to independently possess standing where the in-
tervention is into a subsisting and continuing Article III case or con-
troversy and the ultimate relief sought by the intervenors is also being
sought by at least one subsisting party with standing to do so."' There-
fore, even though the Ruiz court assumed that the intervenors did not
have Article III standing, it held that they did not need to have Article
III standing to intervene in a pending case. In reaching this result, the
Fifth Circuit argued that courts requiring intervenors to demonstrate
Article III standing had misinterpreted Diamond and "offer little jus-
tification" for "this new requirement."' 8
71 473 F2d 118 (DC Cir 1972).
72 Id at 130 (citing legislative history and Trbovich in finding standing for union members).
73 Textile Workers Union ofAmerica, CIO v Allendale Co, 226 F2d 765 (DC Cir 1955).
74 Id at 770 (finding that the interventions sought in the case "would serve the ends of jus-
tice").
75 Id (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Wolpe v Poretsky, 144 F2d 505,508 (DC
Cir 1944).
76 161 F3d 814 (5th Cir 1998).
77 Id at 830.
78 Id.
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In addressing a factual situation similar to Diamond, the Sixth
Circuit in Associated Builders & Contractors v Perry79 refused to allow
an intervenor to appeal once one of the original parties had opted not
to appeal. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the failure of an original
party to appeal meant that there was no longer a case or controversy
for the purposes of Article III.n The court, while denying standing
based on facts distinguishable from situations in which an intervenor
is merely trying to have her voice heard in a case on the trial court
level, cited Trbovich for the proposition that standing requirements
are not the same for parties seeking to intervene and parties seeking
to bring the suit originally.8'
In Chiles v Thornburgh,8 the Eleventh Circuit addressed various
types of standing, including standing for counties, states, homeowners,
detainees, and a United States senator to sue the federal government."
In its discussion of intervenors, the court held that "a party seeking to
intervene need not demonstrate that he has standing in addition to
meeting the requirements of Rule 24 as long as there exists a justicia-
ble case and controversy between the parties already in the lawsuit. ''
Importantly, the court went on to state: "The standing cases, how-
ever, are relevant to help define the type of interest that the interve-
nor must assert.' 'n This language hints at the reality of the court's in-
quiry in Chiles, which bore striking similarities to the Article III stand-
ing analysis. The court found in part that the governor of Florida, su-
ing on behalf of his state, did not have standing because the injury he
asserted was not suffered by the state as a whole.- In addition, in find-
ing standing for Dade County to intervene, the court stated, "There
can be no doubt that Dade County has standing under Article III....
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision."' When even a court that has stated
that the Article III standing inquiry is not required still finds it neces-
sary to engage in such an inquiry, the necessity of adopting a clear rule
becomes even more obvious.
79 16 F3d 688 (6th Cir 1994).
80 Id at 692.
81 Id at 690.
82 865 F2d 1197 (11th Cir 1989). Chiles is the case upon which the opening hypothetical is
based. See text accompanying notes 1-5.
83 Senator Chiles was the only party originally suing the Attorney General-the other par-
ties all sought to intervene.
84 Chiles, 865 F2d at 1213.
85 Id.
86 Id at 1209.
87 Id.
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2. Cases holding that Article III standing is a lower hurdle than
the intervention requirements of Rule 24(b).
In a second group of cases, courts held that Article III standing is
a lower hurdle than Rule 24's requirements for intervenors. Therefore,
the courts reason, although intervenors should meet Article III's re-
quirements, permissive intervenors do so by meeting the requirements
of Rule 24(b). While Article III would appear not to prevent interven-
tion under this approach, this test does not fully solve the problems
that result from applying Article III to intervenors because the courts
taking this view proceed to analyze the Article III requirements.
United States v 36.96 Acres of Land is somewhat constructive,
though it deals primarily with intervention as of right. In that case, the
Seventh Circuit held that "[t]he interest of a proposed intervenor...
must be greater than the interest sufficient to satisfy the standing
requirement. ' This statement was based on differentiating between
an interest sufficient for standing and the "direct, significant, legally
protectable interest" required for intervention90 Judge Cudahy's
dissent, however, rebuts the majority's holding by arguing that
requirements for intervention should be more liberal than those for
standing to sue. In. particular, Cudahy relied upon a 1972 Seventh
Circuit opinion, United States v Board of School Commissioners,' for
the proposition that requirements for intervention should be more
liberal than those for standing to sue." Judge Cudahy referred to the
majority's reasoning as "highly formalistic" and "sterile" and cited
numerous authorities for the proposition that "traditional standing is
sufficient interest to intervene where denial of intervention will
prevent appellate review."95
In United States Postal Service v Brennan," the Second Circuit
found that the would-be intervenor at issue was not entitled to inter-
vene as a matter of right and that the district court had not abused its
discretion in denying permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2).9
The court stated, however, "The existence of a case or controversy
having been established as between the Postal Service and the Bren-
88 754 F2d 855 (7th Cir 1985).
89 Id at 859.
90 Id.
91 466 F2d 573 (7th Cir 1972).
92 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F2d at 861 (Cudahy dissenting).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id, citing Moore, 3B Federal Practice § 24.07[2] at 24-48 (cited in note 70); United States
v Imperial Irrigation District, 559 F2d 509 (9th Cir 1977); Bryant v Yellen, 447 US 352,366-68
(1980).
96 579 F2d 188 (2d Cir 1978).
97 Id at 190.
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nans, there was no need to impose the standing requirement upon the
proposed intervenor."'" While that view would appear to favor would-
be intervenors, the fact that the trial court's denial of intervention was
upheld highlights the importance of a clear standard for trial courts to
follow, given the difficulty of fixing an erroneous denial of permissive
intervention at the appellate court level.
3. Cases holding that intervenors must meet
Article III's requirements.
A third group of cases holds that would-be intervenors must meet
the requirements for Article III standing. These cases have relied upon
either a jurisdictional or an "equal footing" argument. The most illu-
minating case in the jurisdictional category is Mausolf v Babbitt, in
which a divided Eighth Circuit panel held that intervenors must meet
the Article III standing requirements. The court reasoned that inter-
venors seek to participate in lawsuits and ask courts to decide the
merits of their claims, so if intervenors do not possess standing, then
their participation threatens to destroy the court's jurisdiction over
the case. Basing its holding on jurisdictional grounds, the majority
stated that "an Article III case or controversy, once joined by interve-
nors who lack standing, is-put bluntly-no longer an Article III case
or controversy."''
Other cases in this category have not relied on the jurisdictional
view advocated by the Eighth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit and D.C.
Circuit have adopted the "equal footing" argument. Under this analy-
sis, because an intervenor is thought to have the same rights and thus
be on equal footing with the original parties in the suit, intervenors
must meet the same standing requirements as the original parties to
the suit.'' The problem with the equal footing argument is that it rests
98 Id.
99 85 F3d 1295 (8th Cir 1996).
100 Id at 1300. An earlier case reaching the same result, but of more limited usefulness, is
Southern Christian Leadership Conference v Kelley, 747 F2d 777 (DC Cir 1984). The analysis in
Kelley is not very helpful because, as the Fifth Circuit has commented, the opinion "merely as-
sumes that Article III requires intervenors to possess standing and offers neither precedent nor
reasons to support this assertion." Ruiz, 161 F3d at 831. In fairness, however, the Kelley opinion
dispenses with Article III issues in such short order because the case involved numerous other
standing-related issues which allowed the court to dispense with the case based on several other
grounds, such as standing for Senator Helms as an individual Senator and standing for Senator
Helms on behalf of the Senate (when the Senate's intent appeared to contradict a grant of stand-
ing). See Kelley, 747 F2d at 781.
101 Cases using this logic include Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 101 F3d 503, 507 (7th Cir 1996) ("The threatened injury [de-
struction of a property right] would give him [the hypothetical party] the minimal standing re-
quired by Article III, which our court requires of any intervenor."); City of Cleveland v Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 17 F3d 1515,1517 (DC Cir 1994) (stating that because a Rule 24 inter-
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on the premise that intervenors are equal to other parties. However,
both Diamond"' and the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v United States Army Corps of En-
gineers'3 indicate that such a premise is false because of the impor-
tance of having original parties involved in the appeal.
In Diamond, the original parties opted not to appeal, and the Su-
preme Court dismissed the intervenor's appeal for want of jurisdic-
tion."1 Thus, an intervenor must hope that an original party appeals,
because the intervenor cannot do so itself. Arguing that a party de-
pendent on original parties is on equal footing with those original par-
ties who are free to appeal regardless of the intervenor's decision
clearly does not make sense. As the Solid Waste Agency opinion rec-
ognized, "[t]he strongest case for intervention is not where the aspi-
rant for intervention could file an independent suit, but where the in-
tervenor-aspirant has no claim against the defendant yet a legally pro-
tected interest that could be impaired by the suit."' While there may
be sound arguments in favor of requiring that permissive intervenors
meet Article III standing requirements, the equal footing argument
does not appear to be one of them.
C. Problems Resulting from the Current Case Law
Due to the circuit split and confusion over the requirements for
intervenors, the situation referred to in the opening hypothetical has
come to pass: one's right to intervene is dependent not upon the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure or the Constitution, but instead upon
the circuit in which the suit is brought. This situation not only denies
would-be intervenors the right to intervene, but also encourages fo-
rum shopping by plaintiffs who anticipate the possibility that a third
party will intervene. 5 These outcomes seem at odds with the Rules
themselves, which state that they are to "be construed and adminis-
tered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
venor seeks to participate on an equal footing with the original parties, he must satisfy the stand-
ing requirements imposed on those parties).
102 476 US 54 (1986).
103 101 F3d 503 (7th Cir 1996).
104 See discussion of Diamond in text accompanying notes 58-62.
105 101 F3d at 507, citing David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention before Courts;
Agencies, andArbitrators, 81 Harv L Rev 721,726-27 (1968).
106 Plaintiffs may even feel that third-party intervention will be in their best interests and
will therefore seek an intervention-friendly jurisdiction. For a discussion of the costs and realities
of forum shopping, see, for example, Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping:A Re-
alistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 Neb L Rev 79, 82 (1989) (urging an acceptance of forum
shopping, in some cases, "as simply a procedural part of litigation"). See also Michael E.
Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 Tlane L Rev 1, 55-57 (1998) (argu-
ing that forum shopping is not as pervasive as is often claimed).
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every action."'' ° While disagreements among the circuits are not un-
usual, a circuit split in an area as fundamental as whether a party's
voice can be heard in litigation in which it has an interest'9 is highly
problematic.
In addition, as United States Postal Service v Brennan demon-
strates,'O' the district courts have a great deal of discretion over grants
of permissive intervention. Therefore, it is even more critical that the
Supreme Court clearly instruct the circuits on what procedure should
be followed in determining whether intervenors can join a suit. That
standard should allow a party to intervene, so long as (1) the would-be
intervenor meets the requirements of Rule 24 and (2) the original par-
ties remain in the suit and satisfy the requirements of Article III
standing.
III. ALLOWING PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION WHEN THE
INTERVENOR SATISFIES RULE 24 AND THE PRIMARY PARTIES
SATISFY ARTICLE III
While it may not always increase the speed of adjudication, the
most equitable way to ensure that justice is done in a particular suit is
to allow intervention by parties who meet the requirements of Rule 24
even if they fail to meet the standing requirements on their own. This
allows relevant voices to be heard, but ensures that the courts will not
become unnecessarily clogged.
Although the Constitution established federal courts as courts of
limited jurisdiction, it allocates to them jurisdiction over "Cases" and
"Controversies."" Once the Article III requirements have been satis-
fied by the existence of a case or controversy between the original
parties, the intervenor should be allowed to have her interests heard
in the suit, particularly because she may have no other remedy.' In
107 FRCP 1. Although it could be argued that a "speedy and inexpensive" determination is
best achieved by not allowing some groups to intervene, a would-be intervenor can still attempt
to have his own cause heard in a separate action. Thus, the opposing party would still have to
spend time and money defending himself in this later suit, or getting the would-be intervenor's
claim in a separate suit dismissed for lack of Article III standing, and would not enjoy finality at
the end of the original suit.
108 The party must have an interest in the litigation, or it would not have met the Rule 24
requirements. See Part II.A.
109 See note 5 and accompanying text.
110 See note 4.
111 This is often alleged by environmental groups seeking to intervene. The Seventh Cir-
cuit's reply to this argument in 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F2d at 859-60, was that parties can seek
a writ of mandamus under 28 USC § 1361 in cases in which they seek to force the government or
an agency to perform a duty. The problem with that argument, as the court acknowledged, is that
"the remedy of mandamus is a drastic one to be invoked only in extraordinary situations." Id at
860. While not addressed by the court, an additional problem is that writs of mandamus are in-
applicable to many of the suits in which parties are attempting to intervene, such as intervention
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addition to allowing an opportunity to be heard when no other oppor-
tunity may exist, allowing an intervenor to participate in a case in
which she has a demonstrated interest is consistent with the language
of Rule 24(b), the spirit of the Federal Rules, and our Constitution's
and political system's emphasis on individual rights and the right to be
heard. To refuse intervention is, in some situations, directly contradic-
tory to the notion that an individual should have her day in court and
be able to fight on her own behalf. Furthermore, this proposed solu-
tion is consistent with Supreme Court language that, if followed by the
lower courts, would appear to resolve this issue. As the Court noted in
1940, the Rule "plainly dispense[s] with any requirement that the in-
tervenor ... have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject
of the litigation.' 'l! 2
Prudential standing is frequently justified as a way to ensure
separation of powers-the courts should not be resolving matters bet-
ter resolved by other branches of government.'" Commentators have
noted that courts are more reluctant to find standing independently
than in cases where Congress, through statute, has provided the plain-
tiff either standing or an argument that she is within the zone of inter-
ests protected by the statute. However, the spirit of the Rules sug-
gests that courts should favor allowing permissive intervention."5 In
addition, the reality is that if Congress wishes to require an Article III
showing, it can express that view, either by statutory enactment or by
using the political means at its disposal to amend the Rules.1
6
Ideally, the Advisory Committee would adopt an amendment
specifying that only the requirements of Rule 24(b) apply to permis-
sive intervenors and that they need not meet Article III's require-
ments when the original plaintiffs in the case have already established
them. But rather than waiting on the Advisory Committee, courts
should simply adopt this approach.17 This would end the confusion
surrounding intervention requirements and ensure that the plight of
in a suit between two private parties over logging rights.
112 SEC v US Realty & Improvement Co, 310 US 434,459 (1940).
113 See generally David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judi-
cial Branch, 1999 BYU L Rev 75 (discussing the Necessary and Proper Clause as the true prem-
ise for most laws regarding the judiciary).
114 Nowak and Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 2.12 at 77 (cited in note 23).
115 See Part I.B for a discussion of the spirit of the Rules.
116 In particular, Congress could express its preference for another rule by amending 28
USC § 1367.
117 See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lesson for
Civil Rules Revision, 85 Mich L Rev 1507,1508 (1987) (arguing that "the Supreme Court and the
Judicial Conference of the United States has [sic] failed to stay abreast of litigation develop-
ments that warrant consideration of Rules amendments" and that the Supreme Court "even with
its extensive drafting support team, needs assistance in its role as principal promulgator of Fed-
eral Rules amendments").
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the party seeking to intervene is not decided based solely on circuit
boundaries, while also allowing Congress to weigh in on the issue, as
the Constitution provides. Even a clear statement that Article III re-
quirements do apply to intervenors would be preferable to the circuit
split. The optimal solution, though, would not require permissive in-
tervenors to meet Article III standing requirements.
This proposed solution comports with the spirit and language of
the Federal Rules generally and Rule 24(b) specifically. As noted
above, Rule 24(a) (intervention as of right) was amended in 1966 in
such a way to prevent the Rule from "defeat[ing] intervention in some
meritorious cases. ' Clearly, the Advisory Committee, while not want-
ing the courts to be overrun with frivolous intervention attempts, did
not intend meritorious intervenors to be barred from intervention un-
necessarily.
The importance of courts' adoption of the proposed solution is
especially great because intervenors frequently lack any political clout
and have no other way to protect their rights. 9 If the parties are
judged to fail the Article III standing requirements as intervenors,
they will almost certainly fail an Article III determination if they were
to attempt to bring a separate suit following the original adjudication.
Even if the intervenors are able to get into court on their own, they
may have difficulty convincing a court to disturb the finality of the
judgment in the initial case, meaning they might never be heard in
court. This is particularly an issue when the would-be intervenor is not
a U.S. senator"" or an organization that could potentially organize to
have a voice in the political process, but is one individual doctor ' or a
group of migrant farm workers." The court system is intended to be a
forum in which the voices of all are heard equally, but applying Article
III standing requirements to permissive intervenors ensures that some
voices are never heard at all.
Beside the point that the inclusion of parties in the judicial de-
termination may increase their support of the judicial system,3 the ju-
118 FRCP 24, Advisory Committee's Note to the 1966 Amendments (modifying subdivision
(a)).
119 Consider, for example, the individual doctor seeking to intervene in Diamond, 476 US at
56, or the migrant workers in Usery, 87 FRD at 673.
120 This was the case in Chiles, 865 F2d at 1200, and Southern Christian Leadership Confer-
ence v Kelley, 747 F2d 777, 778 (DC Cir 1984). For a discussion of Chiles, see notes 82-87 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Kelley, see note 100.
121 This was the case in Diamond, 476 US at 56.
122 This was the case in Usery, 87 FRD at 673.
123 Although some might argue that preserving confidence in the justice system is not a goal
with which the courts should be concerned, there are many reasons why the legal profession
should care about faith in the justice system. Perhaps the most cynical is that "[w]hen people lose
confidence in the justice system, they have little reason to support funding for and the independ-
ence of judges." Karen A. Lash, Pauline Gee, and Laurie Zelon, Equal Access to Civil Justice:
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dicial system can benefit directly from the inclusion of intervenors un-
able to meet Article III's standing requirements. Returning to the
original hypothetical, allowing intervention by a homeowner living
near the facility being used to house convicted felons would enable
the court to hear a perspective that a United States Senator, con-
cerned primarily with the political issue of alleged lies by the Depart-
ment of Justice, might not have. Allowing intervention in this case, as
in many other permissive intervention situations, enables the court to
base its decision on more complete information, thus potentially off-
setting any increase in decision costs by reducing error costs. This ex-
ample indicates that, rather than just benefiting intervenors by making
them feel included, adopting the proposed solution could benefit the
justice system in tangible ways.
Not all parties seeking to intervene are as sympathetic as the mi-
grant workers in Usery v Brandel"4 or the homeowners in Chiles v
Thornburgh.Z Some might argue that would-be intervenors should ei-
ther be able to meet Article III's requirements or use the political
process to effectuate their desired result. However, the reality is that if
parties are powerful enough to find relief in the political process or
able to meet the Article III standing requirements, they may find it
more efficient and satisfactory to pursue suits of their own or use po-
litical pressure than to intervene in another's suit. While intervenors
may include politically powerful groups such as the Sierra Club or pa-
per companies, intervention can also serve as a tool of last resort for
groups and individuals lacking political clout or Article III standing.
A potential drawback to the adoption of the proposed solution is
increased delays in litigation, which would result in higher litigation
costs (both for the parties and the judicial system) and higher adminis-
trative costs. In the case of intervenors, however, granting permissive
intervention does not risk prolonging a determination indefinitely af-
ter the original adjudication because being allowed to intervene does
not entitle a party to appeal once the other parties drop out. Rather,
this Comment proposes adopting a standard (similar to that in Dia-
mond) under which an intervenor can only appeal once the original
parties have dropped out if the intervenor makes an independent
showing of Article III standing.n Therefore, allowing intervention
Pursuing Solutions beyond the Legal Profession, 17 Yale L & Pol Rev 489,500 (1998).
124 87 FRD at 673.
125 865 F2d at 1201-02.
126 Although the Court stated in Stringfellow v Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 US 370,
375-76 (1987), that "[a]n intervenor, whether by right or by permission, normally has the right to
appeal an adverse final judgment by a trial court," the Court held in Diamond, 476 US at 69, that
an intervenor seeking to appeal once the original parties no longer remain in the suit must meet
the Article III standing requirements.
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without a separate showing of standing is not too great a hindrance to
the original parties.
Another concern is that the primary parties to a suit will not be
able to have a determination on the issues between them without their
case being taken over by intervenors who present themselves as con-
cerned citizens or public interest organizations. Rule 24(b) can be ap-
plied to prevent this problem of frivolous intervention. The Rule di-
rects courts to consider "whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.2' r
Courts can ensure that the original parties control the direction of
their suit by finding that a particular intervenor's claims and interests
are "duplicative" and therefore threaten "to unduly delay the adjudi-
cation of the rights of the parties in the lawsuit and make[ ] it unlikely
that any new light will be shed on the issues to be adjudicated..'..
Courts by the same method can frustrate intervenors seeking to take
over the litigation or intervenors whose interests technically rise to
the level required by Rule 24(b) but who are actually interested only
in delaying the case.
In addition, this clear standard of not imposing the requirements
of Article III on intervenors meeting the requirements of Rule 24
would limit the problem of forum shopping (either to prevent inter-
vention by intervenors favorable to the defendant or to encourage in-
tervention by intervenors favorable to the plaintiff). Additionally, al-
lowing intervention may in some cases avoid potential litigation after
the original suit because all parties have participated and are bound
by the suit. Even intervenors who lose on the merits may feel their
voices were heard, so that they no longer feel the need to continue
battling in court. Therefore, allowing intervention can ultimately save
time and resources, as well as preserve faith in the justice system.'
CONCLUSION
The courts should adopt a uniform standard for granting standing
for permissive intervention in a suit. That standard should allow a
party to intervene, so long as (1) the would-be intervenor meets the
requirements of Rule 24 and (2) the original parties remain in the suit
and satisfy the requirements for standing. This rule is consistent with
the language of Rule 24(b), the history and policy goals of permissive
intervention, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In many cases,
the rule would allow voices to be heard in a suit that would otherwise
be silenced. Finally, a uniform rule would avoid punishing would-be
127 FRCP 24(b).
128 Chiles, 865 F2d at 1215.
129 See note 123.
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intervenors based solely on where the original plaintiff filed the suit.
A consistent rule would also recognize that the importance of allow-
ing intervenors to be heard can be reconciled with the concerns of ef-
ficiency and protection of the rights of the original parties as guaran-
teed by Rule 24(b). Moreover, by adopting the rule proposed in this
Comment, courts would recognize that allowing legitimate grievances
to be heard is too important to be determined by district court
boundaries.
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